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Abstract
We show that games of strategic substitutes (or complements) with
aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games, and therefore possess Nash
equilibria in pure strategies. Our notion of aggregation is quite general
and enables us to take a uniﬁed view of several disparate models.
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1 Introduction
Economic theory is replete with examples of what have come to be called,
after Bulow et al (1985), games of strategic substitutes (STS) or strategic
complements (STC). They cover phenomena ranging from1 oligopolistic com-
petition between ﬁrms, to the problem of the commons (Dasgupta and Heal
(1979)), to macroeconomic coordination failures (Diamond (1992)), to new
technology adoption (Katz and Shapiro (1986)), to bank runs (Diamond and
Dybvig (1983)). The essential feature of these games is that, when his com-
petitors turn more aggressive, an agent has incentive to become less so (for
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1This list is only meant to be indicative.
1STS) or more so (for STC). A thorough investigation has already been made
into STC games. For instance, the existence of Nash equilibrium2 (NE) was
proved, under very general conditions, in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and
Vives (1996). But a comparable study is lacking for STC games (except for
the case of two players where, reversing the order of one player’s strategies,
any STS game is converted into an STC game). One goal of our paper is to
begin to redress this imbalance.
General existence of NE in STS games is probably more diﬃcult to es-
tablish than in STC games. A simple example might put the matter in
perspective. Suppose each player has a ﬁnite subset of real numbers for his
strategies, with higher numbers connoting more “aggression.” Start with the
proﬁle of “lowest” strategies, and require all players to unilaterally deviate,
whenever possible, to their best-replies to the proﬁle. Iterate the process.
The sequence of proﬁles so generated will be monotonically increasing in
STC games. Thus it will converge to an NE in ﬁnitely many steps. No
similar argument can be made apriori for STS games. It also does not seem
feasible to transport the general techniques and insights developed for STC
games to the study of STS games.
In this paper we focus attention on STS games which have one further
property: the payoﬀ of a player depends only upon his own strategy, and
some kind of “market aggregate” of others’ strategies. This property is quite
common to many examples, including the most famous of all STS games:
Cournot oligopoly. In the Cournot setting, and indeed in many others, it
suﬃces to take the aggregate to be just the sum of agents’ actions. However,
when the strategic interaction between players is more complex, a broader
concept of aggregation can often render the games amenable to our analysis.
We motivate and develop such a concept in Section 5.
Once we have aggregation, a very striking thing occurs: in STS (or, for
that matter, STC) games, players can be thought of as maximizing one com-
mon payoﬀ function — the potential — in order to deviate to a best reply. Thus,
in terms of the structure of best-reply correspondences (reaction functions),
STS or STC games with aggregation are potential games3 (see Theorem 2).
2Throughout, we conﬁne ourselves to pure strategies; so NE will always mean “pure-
strategy NE.”
3Monderer and Shapley (1996) deﬁned (ordinal) potential games with a more strigent
requirement: all unilateral deviations — not just to best replies — must be rank-ordered by
the potential. (See also Shapley (1990-).) For this reason, we have dubbed our games as
“pseudo-potential” in the main text.
2This has some important ramiﬁcations. First, NE always exist (see The-
orem 1). This is so even for non-convex strategy sets, which are bound to
arise when indivisibilities are present in the economic model. In particular,
for “discrete Cournot”, where each ﬁrm can produce ﬁnitely many levels of
output, NE still exist. This remarkable result was proved by Shapley (1990-
) for the linear Cournot model. It follows from our analysis in somewhat
greater generality. Indeed we show that indivisibilities pose no problem for
the existence of NE in STS games, once there is aggregation. (The analogous
result for STC games follows from the work of Milgrom and Roberts (1990)
and Vives (1996), even without any appeal to aggregation.) Furthermore,
if the games have ﬁnite strategy sets then, for generic payoﬀs, sequential
best-replies converge to NE (see Remark 1). This may have implications for
devising algorithms to compute NE, though we do not pursue that line of
inquiry here.
Our analysis also applies to the standard Cournot model with convex
strategy sets and monotonic (possibly discontinuous) reaction functions, as
in the scenario in Novshek (1985). His existence theorem is obtained as a
byproduct of our analysis (see Remark 6). More generally, strategy sets can
be a mix of discrete and continuous parts, without disturbing the existence
of NE.
But our approach obviously goes far beyond Cournot. As was said, it
brings together and uniﬁes several disparate STS and STC games that have
been analyzed in the literature. A decisive role is played here by the potential
and by our general concept of aggregation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notion
of STS games with simple (additive) aggregation, and state Theorem 1 on
the existence of NE. Pseudo-potential games are introduced in Section 3.
It is shown in Theorems 2 and 3 that pseudo-potential games include STS
games, and always possess NE. Section 4 contains proofs of the theorems.
We develop the concept of general (non-additive) aggregation in Section 5,
and verify that our results remain intact. This implies in particular that our
analysis can be carried over en toto to STC games (see Remark 3). Finally,
in Section 6, we discuss how our approach extends to include discontinuous
reaction functions, yielding the result of Novshek (1985) as a special case.
32 Strategic Substitutes with Aggregation
Consider a set of players N = {1,2,...n}. Each i ∈ N has a set of pure
strategies Si ⊂ R+, which is a ﬁnite union of closed, bounded, and w.l.o.g.
disjoint intervals. (The intervals could all have zero length, in which case Si
is a ﬁnite set). Put S ≡ S1×...×Sn. For any s =( s1,...,sn) ∈ S and t ∈ Si,
denote (s1,...,si−1,t,s i+1,...,s n)b y( s |i t); (s1,...,si−1,s i+1,...,sn)b ys−i;
and
 
j∈N\{i} sj by s−i. The payoﬀ function πi : S → R of player i depends
only upon his own strategy si and the aggregate4 s−i of others’ strategies.
So, with a slight abuse of notation, we will write πi (si,s−i) for πi(s), and
view πi as deﬁn e do nt h ed o m a i nSi × S−i, where S−i ≡
 
j∈N\{i} Sj.
For any choice s−i ∈
 
j∈N\{i} Sj of others’ strategies, the set β
i (s−i)o f
best replies of player i is given by
β
i (s−i) = argmax
t∈Si π
i(t,s−i).




for all i ∈ N.
Finally, let us recall the notion of strategic substitutes. We shall present
it in a slightly more general form than is standard5, allowing for multiplicity
of best replies.
We say that Γ =( N,S1,...,Sn,π1,...,πn) is a game of strategic substitutes
(STS) with aggregation if, for every i ∈ N, there exists a continuous6 and
nonincreasing best-reply selection bi : S−i → Si, i.e.,
(i) bi(x) ∈ β
i (x)f o ra l lx ∈ S−i,
(ii) bi is continuous on S−i,
and
(iii) bi(x) ≤ bi(y) whenever x>y .
4For a more general notion of aggregation see Section 5.
5The term “strategic substitutes” was introduced by Bulow et al (1985) to refer to
games in which the best reply functions of the players are downward slopping. (See also
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).) This property can, in turn, be derived from a more primitive
submodularity assumption on payoﬀs in the game (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).
6If Si is ﬁnite, the requirement of continuity is vacuous. For relaxations of continuity,
see Section 6.
4Our main result is
Theorem 1. A game of strategic substitutes with aggregation has a Nash
equilibrium.
Let us immediately remark that, if we deﬁne strategic complements (STC)
exactly as STS above, except for replacing “x>y ”b y“ x<y ” in (iii), then
Theorem 1 will hold for STC games with aggregation, as indeed will the
rest of our analysis. (See Remark 3 for an explanation). But since existence
results are already known for STC games, we keep STS games in the forefront.
3 Pseudo-Potential Games
We develop the notion of a pseudo-potential game, which will be crucial for
establishing Theorem 1.
Consider a game   Γ =( N,S1,...,Sn,  π
1,...,  π
n)i nw h i c ht h ep l a y e r sa n d
their strategy-sets are as before, but payoﬀ functions   π
i : S → R are allowed
to take a general form. We say that   Γ is a pseudo-potential game if there
exists a continuous function P : S → R such that, for all i ∈ N and all s ∈ S,
argmax
t∈Si   π
i(s |i t) ⊃ argmax
t∈Si P(s |i t).
In other words, each player’s best reply correspondence in the game Γ∗ =
(N,S1,...,Sn,P,...,P)i si n c l u d e di nt h a to f  Γ :i ts u ﬃces for a player to
maximize the potential P, rather than his real payoﬀ   π
i, in order to get to
some best reply. One may therefore think of the potential P as a convenient
common proxy for all the diﬀerent payoﬀ functions   π
i,i∈ N, in the analysis
of NE of   Γ. ( F o r ,a si se v i d e n t ,N Eo fΓ∗ are afortiori NE of   Γ.)
The following two results immediately imply Theorem 1, but may be of
independent interest.
Theorem 2. A game of strategic substitutes with aggregation is a pseudo-
potential game.
Theorem 3. A pseudo-potential game has a pure strategy NE.
5Remark 1 (Generic Convergence of Sequential Best Replies) In
the light of theorem 2, this remark is obvious, but seems worth putting on
record. Consider an STS game with aggregation and with ﬁnite strategy
sets. Then, for generic payoﬀs, all best reply correspondences will be single-
valued. Assume this is the case. Start with an arbitrary strategy proﬁle, and
let each player, one at a time, unilaterally deviate to his unique best reply,





t=1 be a sequence of strategy-proﬁles with the following
property. At every stage t, if sj (t − 1)  = β
j (s−j (t − 1)) for a nonempty
set of players j, one of them (say i) is required to choose his best reply to
s−i(t − 1) at stage t, i.e., si(t)=β
i (s−i(t − 1)); all the other players stay
put at their previous strategies, i.e., s−i (t)=s−i (t − 1). Then the sequence
becomes stationary in ﬁnite time, since the game is pseudo-potential, and
since the monotone sequence {P (s(t))}
∞
t=1 cannot have inﬁnitely many strict
increases on its ﬁnite domain S. The stationary proﬁle is clearly an NE of   Γ.
4P r o o f s
4.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Let Γ =( N,S1,...,Sn,π1,...,πn) be an STS game with aggregation; and, for
all i ∈ N, let bi : S−i → Si be a continuous and nonincreasing best-reply
selection.
Denote by Σ−i the convex hull of S−i.W e e x t e n d bi, in a piecewise-
linear fashion, to a function τi, deﬁn e do nt h ee n t i r ed o m a i nΣ−i. (Thus τi
coincides with bi on S−i, and if x,y ∈ S−i are such that (x,y) ⊂ Σ−i\S−i,
then τi is an aﬃne function on [x,y].) Furthermore, we enhance the do-
main of τi to include the interval [0,minΣ−i], by setting: τi (0) = maxSi,
τi (minΣ−i)=bi (minΣ−i), and then extending τi linearly on (0,minΣ−i).
Figure 1 illustrates the construction of τi (the bold line represents bi and the
broken line represents the rest of τi;b o l di n t e r v a l sa n dd o t so nt h ev e r t i c a l
and horizontal axes represent the sets Si, S−i respectively).
Insert Figure 1
Notice that τi inherits continuity, and the property of being nonincreas-





















We claim that P renders Γ into a pseudo-potential game. To check this, ﬁx
s ∈ S, and suppose that si ∈ argmax
t∈Si P(s |i t). Note that for any t ∈ Si
















Since the second (bracketed) term in (2) is not a function of t, the ﬁrst
term is maximized at si (for the given s−i). We will deduce from this that
si = τi(s−i)( =bi (s−i)).
Note ﬁrst that if t ≤ τi (s−i), then the ﬁrst term in (2) is equal to the
area A(t) of the region (shown shaded in Figure 2) which is bounded by:
the graph of τi and the horizontal line y = t from above,8 the horizontal line
y = 0 from below, the vertical line x = s−i from the left, and the vertical
line x =m a xΣ−i from the right.
Insert Figure 2
7A function of this form ﬁrst came to our attention in Huang (2002). He, however,
deﬁned it under more restrictive assumptions on best-reply functions, in the context of
certain Cournot oligopoly games with convex strategy sets, in order to study properties
of ﬁctitious play.
8Where x and y denote the horizontal and vertical coordinates as usual.
7On the other hand, if t ≥ τi (s−i)( =bi(s−i)), then the ﬁrst term in (2)
is equal to the diﬀerence A(bi (s−i)) − B (t), where B (t) is the area of the
region (shown shaded in Figure 3), which is bounded by: the graph of τi from
below, the horizontal line y = t from above, and the vertical line x = s−i
from the right.
Insert Figure 3
Since A(t) is strictly increasing from minSi to τi (s−i), and since B (t) >
0 for t>τi (s−i), we conclude that the ﬁrst term in (2) has a unique maxi-
mum which is attained at t = τi(s−i)( =bi(s−i)), for the given s−i. Thus,
{s
i} =a r gm a x
t∈Σi P(s |i t)={b
i (s−i)}.
Therefore bi is indeed the best-reply (single-valued) correspondence of i in
the game (N,S1,...,Sn,P,...,P). Since bi, to begin with, was a selection from
the best reply correspondence of Γ =( N,S1,...,Sn,π1,...,πn), we conclude
that Γ is a pseudo-potential game.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Let   Γ =( N,S1,...,Sn,  π
1,...,  π
n) be a pseudo-potential game with poten-
tial P. Suppose s =( s1,...,sn) ∈ arg max
(t1,...,tn)∈S
P(t1,...,tn)( s u c ha ns ex-
ists because P is continuous and S is compact). If s is not an NE of
Γ∗ =( N,S1,...,Sn,P,...,P), then P(s |i t) >P (s) for some t ∈ Si, con-
tradicting that s maximizes P.
But any NE of Γ∗ is afortiori an NE of   Γ, since best replies in Γ∗ are by
deﬁnition best replies in   Γ.
5 Non-Additive Aggregation
Adding up players’ strategies is but one way of aggregating them. It suits
most of the examples we have cited, starting with Cournot oligopoly. How-
ever, there are also many kinds of strategic interaction which, at ﬁrst glance,
8look alien to our framework. It is only when appropriate aggregators α :
S−i → R are constructed for them, that their hidden structure is unmasked,
and they ﬁt into our framework, with s−i replaced by α(s−i)a n dS−i by
α(S−i).








for 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1 (i.e., s∗
−i (k) is the sum of all possible products of k distinct
strategies picked from s−i =( s1,...,s i−1,s i+1,...,s n); and so for k =1w eg e t
s∗







For the moment assume, by way of simplicity, that the scalars ak are such
that α(s−i) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and all s−i ∈ S−i. (This restriction can be






k=1 for all i ∈ N.
Our aggregators are seemingly abstruse. We shall now give three examples
to illustrate how they might arise in a natural manner. In all the examples,
each player i chooses eﬀort level si ∈ [0,Bi] to apply to the personal task
faced by him. This gives rise to the probability pi (si) of “success” in his task,
where pi :[ 0 ,Bi] → [0,1] is a strictly increasing function. By relabeling eﬀort
levels if necessary, we take Bi =1a n dpi (si)=si. The events of individual
success are assumed to be independent across diﬀerent players. Furthermore,
for ease of calculation, we suppose there are three players (N = {1,2,3}),
and that each i incurs quadratic cost ci (si)
2 , on account of his eﬀort si, for
some constant ci > 0.
Example 1 (Team Projects with Complementary Tasks) Each
player’s task is critical to the success of the team’s project. Thus s1s2s3 is
the probability that the project will succeed. Suppose ri > 0 is the utility to


















9where α(s−i) is the aggregator s∗
−i (2) = sjsk (where we have denoted N\{i} =











which is a nondecreasing function of α(s−i); and shows that we have an STC
game with aggregation (when s−i is replaced by α(s−i)).
Example 2 (Team Projects with Substitutable Tasks) Here we
suppose that each player by himself can make the project successful. Then












































i 2 = ris
















is a nonincreasing function of α(s−i), and so this example describes an STS
game with aggregator α.
Example 3 (Tournaments) Assume that a reward of r dollars is shared
by the group of players who succeed. If only one player succeeds, he gets r
for sure; if exactly two succeed, each gets r with probability 1
2; if all three
succeed, each gets r with probability 1
3. By rescaling utilities, we may assume
w.l.o.g. that r dollars yield r utiles to each player. Then the the expected

















































i [1 − α(s−i)],
10where α(s−i)=1
2s∗
−i (1) − 1
3s∗























is a nonincreasing function of α(s−i), and therefore tournaments are also
STS games with aggregator α.
As we said, our results remain intact if we postulate that the payoﬀ to
any player i depends only upon his own strategy si and the aggregate α(s−i)
of others’ strategies. Other than the obvious change of notation (s−i replaced
by α(s−i)a n dS−i by α(S−i)), the only variation needed is in the proof of

















Note that for any i ∈ N,


































The above equality replaces (2) in the proof of Theorem 2, and the rest of
the arguments hold exactly as before.
Remark 2 (Aggregation without the Positivity Requirement)
The requirement that aggregation be nonnegative can be dropped. If α(s−i)
is negative for some s−i ∈ S−i, we can deﬁne another aggregator   α by
  α(s−i) ≡ α(s−i)+a for all i ∈ N and all s−i ∈ S−i. Clearly, for large
11enough a,   α(s−i) is always nonnegative. It is obvious that if i’s payoﬀ is a
function of si and α(s−i), then it is representable also as a function of si and
  α(s−i), and any nonincreasing and continuous best-reply selection remains
such after this change of variables. Our analysis holds with these “non-
homogeneous”aggregations just as well. One only has to add s∗


















Remark 3 (STC Games with Aggregation) The previous remark
also enables us to include STC games with aggregation in our approach.
Indeed, given an STC game with aggregator α, the payoﬀ function of each
player i can be obviously redeﬁned to depend on si and   α(s−i) ≡− α(s−i),
instead of si and α(s−i). Consequently, if a best-reply selection bi is a non-
decreasing function of α (which is the case for STC), it turns into   bi(  α) ≡
bi (−  α), a nonincreasing function of   α, and our analysis goes through by Re-
mark 2. Note that this trick is purely technical, and does not change the STC
character of the game: while   bi is a nonincreasing function of   α, it remains
nondecreasing in the underlying basic variable s−i.
6 Discontinuous Best Reply Selections
We do not know if continuity of our best reply selections is necessary for the
validity of Theorem 1. However, Theorem 1 stays intact even if discontinu-
ities are allowed, provided one of the following assumptions is made:
(i) Γ is a game of strict strategic substitutes, i.e., for every i ∈ N there
exists a best reply selection bi which is a strictly decreasing function9 of s−i
(it does not have to be continuous);
(ii) for every i ∈ N there exists a best reply selection bi which is nonin-
creasing and right-continuous;
(iii) for every i ∈ N there exists a best reply selection bi which is nonin-
creasing and left-continuous.
9For ease of notation, we revert from α(s−i)t os−i (though the argument holds re-
placing s−i by α(s−i) throughout, provided we assume that α(s−i) is strictly increasing
in s−i).
12To see this, construct τi and P exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2. P
is continuous as before, but this time
argmax












for all i ∈ N and all s ∈ S. In particular, argmax
t∈Si P(s |i t)n e e dn o tb e
single-valued, if τi is discontinuous at s−i. (This is why P may fail to be a
pseudo-potential function for the given game.) However, it follows from (3)
that
b
i (s−i) ∈ argmax
t∈Si P(s |i t), (4)
as before.
Now consider some s =( s1,...,sn) ∈ arg max
(t1,...,tn)∈S
P(t1,...,t n). Suppose
ﬁrst that assumption (i) is satisﬁed for every bi. Note that if there is i ∈ N
(say, i = 1) such that s1  = b1 (s−1), then by (4), s  ≡ (b1 (s−1),s 2,...,sn) ∈
arg max
(t1,...,tn)∈S
P(t1,...,tn). Obviously, since s and s  maximize P,si ∈ argmax
t∈Si P(s |i
t)a n d( s )
i ∈ argmax























But clearly s−2  = s 
−2, and so, from the fact that τ2 is strictly decreasing, the
intersection of the above two intervals must be empty. This is a contradiction,
so si = bi (s−i)f o ra l li ∈ N, and s is an NE of Γ.
Next suppose that assumption (ii) holds. Then, since every bi (and τi)i s





t∈Si P(s |i t)
 
(5)
for all i ∈ N. If (say) s1 / ∈ argmax
t∈S1 π1 (s1,s−1), then b1 (s−1) <s 1 by (5) and
the fact that s1 ∈ argmax
t∈S1 P(s |1 t). Thus for all j  =1
s 
−j < s−j, (6)





t∈Sj P(s |j t) ∩ argmax
t∈Sj P(s
  |j t)
13for all j  =1 , the conjunction of (3), (6), and the fact that τj is nonincreasing,
yields
s




  |j t)
 
. (7)




by (5). Thus (s )





for all j  =1 . Since (s )




by deﬁnition, s  is an
NE of Γ.
Finally, when assumption (iii) holds, the analysis is similar as for assump-
tion (ii).
Remark 4 (Novshek’s Existence Theorem for Cournot Oligopoly)
If the best-reply correspondence of every player in Γ is nonempty-valued, up-
per hemi-continuous, and nonincreasing in the sense that10 maxβ
i (x) ≤
minβ
i(y)w h e n e v e rx>y ,t h e nΓ satisﬁes both (ii) and (iii) above. Indeed,
b
i
r (x)=m i nβ
i (x) for all x ∈ S−i
deﬁnes a nonincreasing best-reply selection which is right-continuous, and
b
i
l (x)=m a xβ
i(x)f o ra l lx ∈ S−i
deﬁnes a nonincreasing best-reply selection which is left-continuous.
This observation can be quite useful. For instance, Novshek (1985) showed
that, under quite general conditions, best-reply correspondences in Cournot
oligopoly are nonempty, upper hemi-continuous and nonincreasing. Thus our
analysis implies Novshek’s result on the existence of NE.
10Note that maxβ
i (x)a n dm i nβ
i (y)a r ew e l ld e ﬁned by upper hemi-continuity.
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